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Abstract
The paper reviews studies on prelinguistic
infants’ gestures and the evidence for deictic
and for symbolic gestural communication be-
fore language. First, recent and new studies
demonstrate that prelinguistic infants commu-
nicate in complex ways with deictic gestures, in
particular pointing, and that pointing is closely
related to the emergence of language. These on-
togenetic findings thus support gestural origins
and social-pragmatic accounts of human com-
munication and show that human communica-
tion emerges first in deictic gestures and is
based on social-cognitive and motivational skills
that run much deeper than language alone. Sec-
ond, however, a review of other, non-deictic ges-
tures suggests that prelinguistic infants use
these other gestures initially low-frequently,
non-representationally, and with little or no di-
rect relation to language. These findings qualify
gestural origins accounts and suggest, based on
the cognitive complexities underlying the sym-
bolic use of manual actions, that fully represen-
tational gestures instead emerge after, or even
because of language, and possibly as co-speech
gestures. The review of the evidence both sup-
ports and challenges gestural origins accounts
of language and provides a differentiated per-
spective on gestures in the ontogeny – and like-
wise evolution – of language.
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Deictic and other gestures in infancy
Infants communicate with various kinds of
gesture. Gestural origins accounts of human
communication posit that language evolved
from manual actions and gestures (e.g., Arm-
strong & Wilcox, 2007; Arbib, 2005; Corballis,
2002; Tomasello, 2008; Capirici et al., 2005). So-
cial-pragmatic theories of human communica-
tion emphasize that language-usage and acqui-
sition crucially rely on prior social-cognitive and
cooperative abilities (Grice, 1957; Sperber &
Wilson, 1986; Bruner, 1983). Infants’ gestural
communication is a test case for these ideas.
How do infants use gestures to communicate
in meaningful ways before they have any lan-
guage? With regard to the gestural origins ac-
counts, the questions are: What are the kinds
of gesture that young infants use, and how do
they emerge in relation to language? For exam-
ple, a strong prediction would be that infants
first communicate fully with gestures, and then
spoken language supplants previous gestural
forms. With regard to social-pragmatic theories,
the question is: What are the cognitive com-
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plexities underlying infants’ early gesture use?
For example, a strong prediction would be that
the social-cognitive and symbolic skills of hu-
man communication are present already before
language and first revealed in infants’ gestural
communication. In the current paper I review
the ontogenetic evidence pertaining to gestural
and social-pragmatic origins accounts of human
communication. Based on the available evi-
dence I will argue that only specific forms of
gesture may have preceded language, while oth-
ers in fact may have followed; and that while
most of the key cognitive prerequisites for hu-
man communication are indeed revealed
through prelinguistic gestures, others may still
emerge after language.
Many of the quotidian gestures in adult
communication are culture-specific and con-
ventionalized. For example, while thumbs-up
means ‘good luck’ in the US, it means ‘screw
you’ in Iran (e.g., Archer, 1997). These gestures
work thus like symbolic codes that one has to
learn, just like any other agreed upon signal.
Many gestures are representational in that they
re-present in one or another way the intended
referent. But from an ontogenetic perspective
on gestural origins, the question is not only
whether gestures are learned and produced ear-
lier or more easily than spoken language. The
ontogenetic puzzle is that to acquire even these
gestures, one already has to have quite some
communicative and cognitive skills to under-
stand what it is that they code (see Quine, 1960).
The cognitive argument is thus that there must
be some more natural forms of gestural com-
munication that run much deeper than lan-
guage alone and enable acquisition of linguistic
– and gestural – codes in the first place. Thus,
apart from a possible modality advantage of ges-
tures over spoken language, we still need to
tease apart within the gestural modality more
natural from more codified types of gesture.
Of particular interest are deictic gestures,
like pointing or showing. Deictic gestures work
through ways of presenting others with an as-
pect in the environment. The same gesture can
be used for an infinite set of referents, and the
same act can be used in many diverse ways – be-
cause one can present a referent for many dif-
ferent reasons. This kind of flexibility is striking
and must be very useful if we entail a world of
communication without any words or other
codes at hands. However, this flexibility comes
at the cost of fairly advanced social-cognitive
and cooperative skills. Precisely because of the
lack of any inbuilt ‘meaning‘, deictic gestures
require one to draw inferences about the inter-
locutor’s behavior within a shared situation
(‘common ground’ or ‘joint attentional format’;
see Clark, 1996; Bruner, 1983). What aspect of
the environment has the interlocutor in mind?
Why does the interlocutor indicate that aspect?
Crucially, does the interlocutor go through these
inferences because of the communicative act?
This tripartite of intentionality involving re-
spectively referential, social, and communicative
intentions is part and parcel of deictic gestural
communication (Tomasello, Carpenter &
Liszkowski, 2007). The question is to what ex-
tent infants’ gestures already share the social
and cognitive complexities of the adult version
of this communicative act. When and how in
development do these gestures and their under-
lying complexities emerge, and how do they re-
late to the acquisition of a first language?
Deictic gestures in infancy
Infants begin to use deictic gestures such as
showing (i.e. holding up an object) and pointing
(extending the arm with or without an extended
index-finger in the direction of an object) to-
wards the end of the first year of life. Most of
the research has focused on the pointing ges-
ture (Bates, Camaioni, and Volterra, 1975; Le-
ung & Rheingold, 1981; Murphy, 1978). Bates
and colleagues originally conceptualized point-
ing as a kind of social tool use, and distin-
guished two types of pointing. In proto-impera-
tive pointing infants use the adult as a tool to
obtain an object. In proto-declarative pointing
infants use the object as a tool to obtain adult
attention. Camaioni (1993) proposed that proto-
imperative gestures only require the infant to
understand the other as a causal agent – not a
mental agent – who makes things happen be-
haviorally, whereas proto-declarative gestures
require the infant to understand the other as a
mental agent whose attention may be directed
to external entities (see also Baron-Cohen,
1989). Moore and colleagues (e.g., Moore &
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D’Entremont, 2001) have taken a more thor-
oughgoing lean position and claimed that even
proto-declarative gestures are initially not di-
rected at the mental states of others, but simply
used to gain adult attention to the self. Follow-
ing these authors, a more adult-like version of
pointing first emerges through usage and rein-
forcement around 2 years of age in the linguistic
period, a year after its initial emergence.
Gestural origins accounts of human com-
munication and social-pragmatic theories of
language acquisition, however, would predict
that the gesture not only emerges but is also
used with its respective complexities before lan-
guage. In a series of recent and new experimen-
tal studies my colleagues and I have therefore
challenged the social-cognitively and social-mo-
tivationally ‘lean’ accounts of infant pointing.
We designed different paradigms to elicit and
test pointing in 12-month-old infants. In the
‘Event’-paradigm, interesting events happened,
like a light flashed, a puppet moved, or some-
thing appeared from behind a curtain. In the
search paradigm, an adult searched for some-
thing she needed but could not see. In the re-
quest paradigm, infants desired something out
of reach. We systematically varied in all these
studies the social context, for example what the
experimenter saw, liked, knew about, or wanted.
Specifically, these studies were designed to chal-
lenge the ‘lean’ hypotheses that (i) infants ini-
tially point non-communicatively (Desrochers,
Morissette, & Ricard, 1995); (ii) pointing is non-
referential and does not involve a social-cogni-
tive understanding of the recipients’ attention
(Moore & D’Entremont, 2001); and (iii) infants’
motivation is mainly egocentric, to obtain ob-
jects or attention to the self (Bates et al., 1975;
Moore & D’Entremont, 2001; Gomez, Sarria, &
Tamarit, 1993).
With regard to infants’ communicative in-
tent, previous research has mostly measured in-
fants’ point accompanying looks to a recipient
as an index of their communicative intent. How-
ever, for a variety of reasons, gaze alternation is
not a valid or reliable indicator of communica-
tive intent (e.g., Moore & Corkum, 1994; see
also Harris, Barlow-Brown & Chasin, 1995). For
example, infants might just be orienting to the
adult in response to his behaviours, without
communicative intent. Alternatively, they might
understand the adult’s reaction as communica-
tive even without having to look at him each
time. Using instead measures of persistence
which test intentions to achieve a certain out-
come, we established experimentally that 12-
month-olds point with the intention to commu-
nicate. For example, in the Event-paradigm,
when a recipient did not react to infants’ point-
ing, infants persisted in their communicative
goal and augmented their signal by repeating
their pointing and increasing their vocalizations
significantly more than when the adult typically
reacted by sharing attention and interest
(Liszkowski et al., 2004; 2007a). Even more
clearly, before infants initiated a point, they con-
sidered whether the recipient attended to them
and so could see their point. When an adult
turned sideways and did not look at infants (and
so could not possibly see the pointing gesture),
infants pointed significantly less than when the
adult was turned toward them and so could see
and react to their visual gesture (Liszkowski,
Albrecht, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). Re-
cently, Franco, Perucchini, and March (2009)
further showed that infants point significantly
less when the adult is absent compared to when
she is present, and that infants do not only point
in response to adults but also for peers. Togeth-
er, these findings thus establish experimentally
that 12-month-olds point with the intention to
communicate.
With regard to infants’ referential intentions,
Moore and D’Entremont (2001) claimed that in-
fants do not intend to direct others’ attention
based on their finding that infants often pointed
at things another person was already attending
to. However, one can refer to things others are
already attending to, for example to express
some form of interest in it. In our studies we
used again the measure of persistence and es-
tablished experimentally that infants point with
referential intentions to present others with the
subject of their communication. In two studies
(Liszkowski et al., 2004; 2007a), using again the
Event-paradigm, a recipient misidentified in-
fants’ referents and either attended solely to the
infants’ face, or to an irrelevant object nearby
the intended referent, both times emoting posi-
tively to the infant. In both these cases of refer-
ential misunderstandings, infants attempted to
redirect the recipient’s attention by repeating
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their pointing to their intended referent signifi-
cantly more often than when the recipient had
correctly identified the referent. Further, they
vocalized more and looked more often at the
experimenter.
In two more recent studies we manipulated
the presence or absence of the referent. The un-
derlying reasoning was that referential inten-
tions on a mental level are independent of the
perception or presence of the actual referent.
Although in deictic communication one gener-
ally refers to something present in the environ-
ment, it is possible to go beyond the immediate
‘here and now’ by presenting locations or as-
pects indicative of the referent. For example,
one can point to an armchair and refer to late
grandfather who used to sit in it given enough
shared background (see also Nunberg, 2004, on
deferred reference). Communication beyond the
immediate ‘here and now’ has previously been
taken to be a design feature of human language
(‘displacement’, see Hockett, 1963). In our stud-
ies, we found that prelinguistic infants already
referred to previous events or objects which
were not present at the moment of testing. For
example, in the Event-paradigm, when infants
had attended to an interesting event and it had
ceased, they then pointed to its previous, now-
empty location depending on how a recipient
had reacted to it before (Liszkowski et al.,
2007b). Further, in a request-paradigm, to ob-
tain a desirable object that was absent at the
moment of request, infants – but not chim-
panzees who were tested in the same study de-
sign – pointed to the object’s mutually known
but now-empty location, thus referring to the
absent entity (Liszkowski, Schäfer, Carpenter,
and Tomasello, 2009). Together, these findings
thus establish that infants point with the inten-
tion to refer others to specific events and enti-
ties, and sometimes even to absent referents.
With regard to infants’ motives or reasons
why they communicate about specific entities
and events, main findings are that infants point
for others with cooperative and prosocial in-
stead of purely egocentric motives. Since one
may point for various reasons, we investigated
different kinds of context, seeking to provide
positive evidence for different motives underly-
ing infants’ pointing. In the Event-paradigm,
we found that infants point at interesting events
to share their interest about these events with
others. For example, when an adult only ori-
ented to the infant’s referent but then did not
comment on it (Liszkowski et al., 2004), or
when the adult commented about the referent
in an unenthusiastic way and communicated
to the infant that her interest did not match
the infant’s interest (Liszkowski et al., 2007a),
infants’ intention was not satisfied as reflected
in their differential pattern of pointing: When
the experimenter did not comment at all, in-
fants persisted and repeated their pointing;
when the experimenter’s comment was unin-
terested instead of positive, infants did not per-
sist but ceased pointing over trials (although
they remained generally interactive with the
adult throughout the experiment). Crucially,
when the adult already knew about the referent,
infants still pointed at it but only if the adult
had expressed interest in it, presumably to
share and express their alignment with the
adult’s expression of attitude (Liszkowski et al.,
2007b; see also Liebal, Carpenter & Tomasello,
in press). These findings show that infants do
not only want to share the visual focus on a
referent, they want to express and share their
attitudes about a referent, too (what we have
termed ‘expressive pointing’).
In a recent, more natural paradigm we ob-
served parents and infants in a ‘decorated room’,
remotely analogous to a visit in a zoo or exhibit.
Parents were instructed to take a look together
at the decoration items, with no mentioning of
pointing. Findings were that parents and infants
spontaneously pointed, and that their pointing
was positively correlated (Liszkowski &
Tomasello, submitted). Interestingly, follow-up
analyses (Puccini & Liszkowski, 2009) revealed
that a portion of the points were in response to
the interlocutors points (within 10 sec.) and pos-
itively interrelated. The follow-up further
showed that infants’ degree of joint pointing (as
indexed by responsive points) correlated with
infants’ time spent in manual joint actions in a
free play context (‘active joint engagement’).
These findings provide further support that in-
fants use pointing indeed cooperatively in the
shared activity of looking at things together.
However, adults also point for other reasons,
for example to provide relevant and needed in-
formation for others (‘informative pointing’). In
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essence, this kind of pointing is motivated by
helping others find things without immediate
direct benefit to the pointer. For example, when
I see you searching for something, and I see a
key under a chair, I will point it out for you,
even if I do not know you or have any interest in
the key itself. Using a newly developed search-
paradigm, we demonstrated for the first time
that infants too point to help others by provid-
ing them with relevant information. In the stud-
ies, when infants were confronted with an adult
searching for one of two things, infants pointed
to the relevant object to help the adult find it,
with no requestive accompaniments or particu-
lar interest in the object (Liszkowski et al.,
2006), and they did this more so when the adult
needed help to find it than when she did not
(Liszkowski et al., 2008). More recently, we
found that infants also provide information to
warn others in anticipation of a negative action
outcome (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2010). In the
study, the experimenter experienced unforeseen
negative effects (pain or disgust) when acciden-
tally bumping into an object in the course of
her play with marbles. Subsequently she re-
moved the object out of her way. In her absence,
someone else accidentally pushed the object
back into the way. When the experimenter re-ap-
peared, infants spontaneously pointed out the
object, even though the experimenter did not
search for anything and the object did not move
in interesting ways. Infants pointed significant-
ly less in control conditions, when the object
was either positive (thus not evoking negative
side effects) or the experimenter had witnessed
the location change (and thus the problem was
known already). Both, informing others to help
them find something, and warning others to
help them avoid something are based on a
prosocial motivation. Informative pointing and
warning may be interpreted as the ontogeneti-
cally earliest evidence for altruistic helping with-
out direct benefit for the self.
Infants point of course also with other mo-
tives, most prominently to request objects for
themselves (‘imperative pointing’; Bates et al,
1975). But unlike previous research (e.g., Ca-
maioni, 1993), the claim is that even impera-
tive pointing relies on a cooperative infrastruc-
ture of human communication. Evidence is still
a bit sparse, but one fundamental difference
that distinguishes infants’ from apes’ requests
are infants’ referential intentions and commu-
nication on a mental level, as revealed by their
indirect requests of absent things through point-
ing to empty locations (Liszkowski et al., 2009).
Some other evidence with slightly older chil-
dren further shows that children do not only
want their requests to be fulfilled, but also un-
derstood (Shwe & Markman, 1997; Grosse et
al., submitted). Another requestive motive for
pointing is to request information (‘interroga-
tive pointing’). Several authors have proposed
that infants may point interrogatively (Yamada
& Nakanishi, 1983; Baldwin & Moses, 1996;
Liszkowski, 2005; Southgate, van Maanen &
Csibra, 2007) but there is currently little evi-
dence that infants indeed use pointing in this
way (but see Kovacs et al., 2010). In sum then,
the reasons why infants point at specific events
and entities are various. Most, if not all of them
involve cooperative and prosocial motives, in
particular to align with others and accumulate
common ground, or to help others pursue their
actions.
With regard to 12-month-olds’ social-cogni-
tive understanding, our studies directly tested
their understanding of others’ intentional and
epistemic states. In the Event paradigm, infants
understood others’ attention as evidenced by
significantly more pointing when the adult had
not yet seen the event than when she already
had. Infants pointing further revealed an un-
derstanding of the adult’s attitudinal relations
to the referent (Liszkowski et al., 2007a, b). In
the search paradigm, infants understood an
adult’s intention to find an object and they un-
derstood whether the adult was knowledgeable
or ignorant (Liszkowski et al., 2006; Liszkowski
et al., 2008). The warning paradigm further clar-
ified that infants anticipate others’ actions based
on an understanding of their goals and epis-
temic states, even in the absence of behavioural
manifestations like effortful trying or search be-
haviours (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2010). The
latter study suggests an emerging belief-desire
psychology of action predictions in the service
of collaborative communication (see Knudsen &
Liszkowski [submitted] for further evidence of
18-and 24-month-olds’ productive usage of ‘the-
ory-of-mind’-skills in an anticipatory correcting
paradigm). From the comprehension side fur-
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ther studies show that twelve-month-olds com-
prehend others’ pointing in terms of the point-
er’s underlying referential intentions (Gligia &
Csibra, 2009), and that infants’ referential un-
derstanding of pointing is bi-directional as evi-
denced by correlations of infants’ point produc-
tion and their comprehension of pointing to
occluded referents (Behne, Liszkowski, Carpen-
ter & Tomasello, submitted; Liszkowski &
Tomasello, submitted;).
In sum then, recent and new experimental
findings provide a new look at infant pointing as
a fully communicative act including full fledged
reference on a mental level, even to absent enti-
ties, with cooperative motives like sharing and
helping, all before language has emerged. These
findings thus support gestural origins accounts
and social-pragmatic theories of human com-
munication. They provide ontogenetic evidence
that human communication emerges first in the
gestural modality of deictic communication and
is based on social-cognitive and motivational
skills that run much deeper than language
alone.
Emergence of deictic gestures and
their relation to language
The exact process of the emergence of
pointing is not well understood at the moment
(see also Lock, Young, Service, & Chandler,
1990). Since pointing is not functional as an
object-directed individualistic action (unlike
e.g., reaching), and because it is used commu-
nicatively with cooperative motives and a so-
cial-cognitive understanding from the begin-
ning, pointing does not seem to originate
simply from individualistic object-directed ac-
tions, in particular not from reaching (see also
Franco & Butterworth, 1996). Presumably, as
already suggested by Werner & Kaplan (1963),
the ability to refer originates in interpersonal
contexts. That is, it originates from an emerg-
ing motive to share objects together as “objects-
of-regard”. This is supported by correlational
findings of spontaneous caregiver and infant
pointing (Liszkowski & Tomasello, submitted)
and correlations between caregiver and infant
joint acting and joint pointing (Puccini &
Liszkowski, 2009). Whether the particular form
of pointing with the index finger arises through
imitation or has a more biological basis, is not
clear. However, recent results from a compara-
tive study across seven very different cultural
settings showed that 12-month-olds pointed
with the extended index-finger. This supports
the idea that this is a universal gesture
(Liszkowski, Brown, Callaghan, deVos, Takida,
2010). Very little is known about the showing
gesture in infants, but it may be a precursor to
pointing because it emerges before pointing
(Bates et al., 1975) and is presumably also
found universally across cultures (Salomo &
Liszkowski, 2010). In any case, given the com-
municative complexities of pointing when it
has just emerged, pointing must be conceptual-
ized as developmental accomplishment of – and
not a precursor to – referential communication.
Once pointing has emerged, it is interesting
to note that its frequency in use still increases
over the second year of life (Lock et al., 1990),
suggesting that it continues to play a pivotal
role in infant communication. Indeed, the onset
of pointing is correlated with the onset of first
words (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2008; Carpenter et
al., 1998; Harris et al., 1995). Most strikingly,
much of infants beginning linguistic communi-
cation is complemented through pointing acts.
These word+point combinations change in qual-
ity over the second year of life. Infants first con-
vey redundant referential information with their
point and word (e.g. point to cup and say
“cup”). Subsequently, infants convey different,
supplemental information elements with their
word+point combinations, for example by
pointing to the cup and saying “mommy”
(Capirci, Iverson, Pizzuto & Volterra, 1996; Iver-
son & Goldin-Meadow, 2005). The latter type of
supplemental word+point combinations is even
predictive of the onset of the two-word stage
around 2 years of age. These developmental
findings thus show, in infants, that deictic ges-
tures and spoken words are tightly intertwined.
Finally, non-human primates, who never acquire
language, and children with autism whose lan-
guage impairment is both a symptom and a
source of their condition, do not point like typi-
cally developing children do (e.g., Tomasello &
Camaioni, 1997). This provides further evidence
for the tight link between deictic gestures and
the emergence of language.
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Other gestures
The evidence shows that deictic gestures
play a main role in infants’ prelinguistic com-
munication: They emerge before language; in-
fants use them to communicate in complex
ways; and they are tightly coupled with later
emerging first words and early syntax. These
findings are in strong support of social prag-
matic theories and gestural origins accounts of
language. However, infants also use a variety of
other gestures. In the remainder I will discuss
what we currently know about the communica-
tive complexities of these non-deictic, other ges-
tures and what their role is in the emergence
of language. Broadly speaking, two core types
can be distinguished: ritualized gestures and rep-
resentational gestures. Ritualized gestures are
conceptualized as involving simpler forms of
communication and cognition, shared with non-
human primates (e.g., Tomasello, 2008). Repre-
sentational gestures are conceptualized as
uniquely human forms of symbolic communi-
cation, involving more complex representation-
al processes than deictic gestures (e.g., Bates,
1979).
Ritualized gestures originate in individualis-
tic goal-directed action schemes (Tomasello,
2008). For example, the ‘hands-up’ gesture as a
request to be picked up originates in individual
attempts to actually climb up. These attempts
become abbreviated and stylized in form over
time as the interlocutor anticipates and accom-
modates to the emitter’s goal. Since ritualized
chains of behaviours are based on behavioural
associations, no deeper social-cognitive skills
are necessary to understand the goal of a ritual-
ized action gesture. Ritualized gestures also do
not involve a bi-directional understanding, be-
cause the usage between emitter and recipient is
not reversed (e.g., it is only the infant who
reaches up – not the adult – and only the adult
who picks up – not the infant). Non-human pri-
mates learn the majority of their gestures
through ontogenetic ritualization (Call &
Tomasello, 2007). Although ritualized gestures
look like symbolic codes, in fact they are not, be-
cause they are used in a specific way, and be-
cause they are not acquired and not used with a
bi-directional understanding of re-presenting
anything other than the present activity.
In contrast to ritualized gestures – and in
contrast to deictic gestures which indicate a ref-
erent by means of presenting an aspect in the
environment – representational gestures indi-
cate a referent by means of re-presenting a ref-
erent with a gesture commonly associated with
it. In essence, the gesturer presents a gestural
event, and this event is associated with a refer-
ent. These associations are usually arbitrary and
conventional (socially constructed). Represen-
tational gestures are thus symbolic and work
just like spoken symbolic words of natural lan-
guages. Gestural origins accounts of human
communication should predict that these forms
of gestural communication emerge prior to spo-
ken language. One question is thus whether
there is a modality advantage of symbolic ges-
tures over spoken words.
However, a special feature of representa-
tional gestures is that their association with a
referent can also be based on some kind of icon-
ic depiction or pantomimic relation. Of course,
many iconic gestures are in addition conven-
tionalized, because the gestural depiction of a
referent is often not transparent enough and
somewhat arbitrary in itself. However, purely
iconic gestures are distinct from conventional-
ized gestures because they can be created and
used on the fly – given enough shared back-
ground about the aspects they depict! Since
purely iconic gestures, just like pointing, do not
require the handling of any pre-specified se-
mantic codes, social-pragmatic theories of hu-
man communication would predict that they
rely on similar social-cognitive skills together
with additional cognitive skills of representa-
tions. A further question is thus whether infants
use creatively invented iconic gestures in rep-
resentational/symbolic ways before they have
acquired any language.
Bates (1979) proposed that infants begin to
name things with both words and representa-
tional gestures at about the same time, around
13 months of age. This suggests that there is no
modality advantage of gestures over words. In a
larger sample, in a longitudinal study of infants’
naturally occurring gestures and words at 16
and 20 months of age, Iverson, Capirci, and
Caselli (1994) found that the number of repre-
sentational gestures at 16 months was much
smaller than the number of representational
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words (25% of the number of representational
words) (see also Capirci et al., 2005). Further,
representational gestures decreased at 20
months, while deictic pointing and representa-
tional words still increased. Goodwyn and
Acredolo (1993) argued that infants are more
frequently exposed to words than gestures and
conducted a training study to accommodate for
this asymmetry. However, the gesture-training
yielded only a minor advantage of about 3
weeks in the onset of representational gestures
over words (around 14-15 months). In sum, cur-
rent studies do not provide strong evidence for a
modality advantage of representational gestures
over words in onset and usage. If anything, they
show the reverse pattern with representational
gestures emerging after words (Pizzuto & Capo-
bianco, 2005).
Compared to the bourgeoning studies on
pointing, little is yet known about how infants
use their representational gestures. In one of
the first studies, Acredolo and Goodwyn (1988)
conducted longitudinal interviews with parents
of 16 infants, beginning at 11 months of age,
over a weekly assessment period of 9 months, to
document the repertoire and usage of infants’
representational gestures. Main findings were
that infants used non-deictic gestures that were
classified as some form of representational ges-
tures. Following parental interviews, most in-
fants (75%) used representational gestures to
name objects (e.g., sniffing for ‘flower’), some-
times to request actions (e.g., knob-turning for
‘open door’; arms-up for ‘pick me up’), and to a
lesser extent to refer to object attributes (blow
for ‘hot’; palms up for ‘all gone’). These gestures
were overall low in frequency and emerged
around 14-15 months. Other studies have also
considered actions with or without objects as
communicative gestures if they were used in
some kind of playful or pretend situations (e.g.,
bringing empty cup to mouth for “drink”; rais-
ing empty fist to ear for “telephone”) (Caselli,
1990; Capirci et al., 2005). Overall, these studies
do not provide strong evidence that infants use
the gestures representationally and flexibly
across a variety of contexts to refer to specific
referents.
But do infants spontaneously create iconic
depictions of referents, and if so, to what ex-
tent do these emerge prior to language or prior
to the acquisition of the corresponding spoken
labels? Most studies suggest that the relatively
infrequently occurring representational gestures
apparently originate in conventional interaction
formats and routines and are not spontaneously
invented. Although Goodwyn and Acredolo
(1988) stressed that about half of infants’ ob-
ject-gestures were not explicitly taught, follow-
ing parents’ report, also these gestures were ap-
parently only used in specific situations (e.g.,
rubbing tummy for ‘soap’ when taking a bath).
Current studies do not provide strong evidence
that young infants spontaneously create iconic
gestures to represent a referent. Further, from a
comprehension side, Namy (2008) showed that
infants understand the iconic depiction of ac-
tions only from around 26 months of age, an
age at which they already have a considerable
vocabulary size.
It is difficult to know about the cognitive
underpinnings of infants’ representational ges-
ture use without further experimental evidence.
Comprehension studies mostly show that young
infants associate a range of different non-ver-
bal, verbal and gestural events with specific sit-
uations or objects after repeated exposure (e.g.
Campbell & Namy, 2003), but it is unclear
whether young infants understand the repre-
sentational aspects of these events. The produc-
tion studies currently do not provide evidence
that young infants indeed use their representa-
tional gestures to re-present anything. Precisely
because the reported gestures mostly originate
in social routines and conventional formats, an
alternative interpretation is that infants initially
present with their representational gestures
nothing other than their usage itself. In other
words, it is possible that infants’ ‘representa-
tional’ gestures simple present, but not re-pre-
sent, infants’ participation in social activities.
A thorough-going lean position might claim
the same for infants’ first words. However, it is
also possible that the symbolic usage of words is
acquired more easily than that of representa-
tional gestures. Words are by default used to rep-
resent a referent. Gestures instead rely on ac-
tion schemes, and actions, by default, are used to
act on the world, not to represent it. Symbolic
gesture-use thus requires decoupling the action
schema from an action goal and re-interpreting
it as standing in for something else (Leslie,
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1987). The cognitive argument is thus that the
symbolic usage of representational gestures is
initially even more challenging than using words.
Research on infants’ cognitive development sug-
gests that children develop a representational
understanding around age two, when they cre-
atively extend pretend scenarios (Harris & Ka-
vanaugh, 1993), map scale-models to the real
world (DeLoache, 2004), and understand pictor-
ial symbols (Preissler & Carey, 2004).
Other gestures and their relation
to language
With regard to the developmental relations
between other gestures and language, converg-
ing evidence shows that infants initially do not
combine their ‘representational’ gestures with
words or points (Capirci et al., 1996; Iverson &
Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Pizzuto & Capobianco,
2005). This is striking when compared to in-
fants’ frequent combinations of deictic pointing
gestures with words in those same studies. In-
fants thus use their representational gestures
quite differently from adults who frequently ac-
company them with speech (McNeill, 1992;
Kendon 2004). Representational gestures also
do not predict, to the best of my knowledge, the
onset of first words, which is again in stark con-
trast to several studies showing relations be-
tween deictic gestures and the emergence of lan-
guage (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2008; Carpenter et
al., 1998; Harris et al., 1995). Indeed, it is un-
known whether the absence of infant represen-
tational gestures would significantly impact ear-
ly language acquisition, while the absence of
pointing in fact is diagnostic of early autism
(Baron-Cohen, 2000).
It is not entirely clear whether infants know
the spoken labels for at least some of their ges-
tures, and to what extent spoken and gestural la-
bels correspond to each other (but see Capirci et
al, 2005). But curiously, research on older chil-
dren shows that it is around 2 to 3.5 years of age
that children frequently begin to accompany
their speech with iconic gestures, similar to
adults, and that the meaning matches between
the two modalities (Nicoladis et al., 1999). Nico-
ladis and colleagues investigated speech accom-
panying gestures in five bilingual children and
found that the occurrence of speech and iconic
gesture combinations were influenced by the
proficiency of the language with which the ges-
tures were used. This finding indicates a relation
between iconic gestures and language that is in
fact the reverse of what gestural origins of lan-
guage and ‘language-from-action’ accounts
would predict. The currently available evidence
and the argument from cognitive complexities
underlying the manual use of symbolic actions
may thus suggest that representational and
iconic gestures rather emerge through language
– as symbolic actions – and not the other way
around.
Conclusion
Around twelve month of age, human infants
begin to communicate in meaningful ways
through gesture, already before they have de-
veloped any productive language skills. Infants’
communication rests on the basic psychological
foundations of adult human communication,
that is, a cooperative motivation to interact with
each other, together with a social-cognitive un-
derstanding of others’ mental agency. This psy-
chological infrastructure enables prelinguistic
infants to express and understand communica-
tive, referential, and social intentions within
shared situations. Using the single pointing ges-
ture, infants communicate a wealth of informa-
tion. Although it is ‘only one’ gesture, this is less
surprising when considering that one can ex-
press a myriad of different things with pointing
precisely because it is entirely deictic and not
symbolically codified. Findings show that in-
fants, like adults, use the pointing gesture with-
in shared common ground even to refer to oc-
cluded entities and entities that are absent from
mutually known locations. Infants’ usage of
pointing is thus much broader than simple con-
ceptions of attention directing to discrete, per-
ceivable objects in space. Developmentally, in-
fants’ pointing is closely linked to language
acquisition, and its absence or aberrant devel-
opment are, for example, both a symptom and a
source of autism disorder. Thus, in support of
gestural origins and social-pragmatic accounts
of human language, there is a solid fundament
of gestural, deictic communication already be-
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fore language has emerged. This kind of gestur-
al deictic communication, however, means that
even though displacement and reference beyond
the ‘here and now’ are possible, infants’ com-
munication is still fully dependent on visually
shared situations.
But infants also use several other gestures.
These have been described as ritualized gestures,
shared with non-human primates, and as repre-
sentational gestures, part of uniquely human
symbolic communication. The question has been
to what extent infants use these other gestures
symbolically, in particular those gestures that
have been described as representational, and to
what extent these gestures indeed constitute a
“second dawn” in infants’ communicative devel-
opment (Bates, 1979). A review of the current
findings suggests that representational gestures
play a rather minor role in the transition to rep-
resentational spoken language and, to date, little
is known about the cognitive complexities un-
derlying infants’ usage of representational ges-
tures. One may indeed wonder whether their ab-
sence would significantly impact language
acquisition. Based on the available empirical ev-
idence it is plausible that infants initially use
these gestures as participatory activities that pre-
sent infants’ usage, but do not necessarily re-pre-
sent anything other than the gestural social ac-
tivity itself. Arguments about the cognitive
requirements and findings of a late emerging
gesture-speech integration give rise to the idea
that representational gestures rather constitute a
“third dawn”, after language, when children
come to understand that they can use manual
actions to represent things (instead of acting on
things). These findings thus shed a differentiated
perspective on gesture in the origins of language
and suggest that some gestures even emerged
after auditory, spoken forms of communication.
Language often underdetermines what is ac-
tually being communicated. Deictic communi-
cation is the example par excellence (see Levin-
son, 2004), because deictic communication
cannot be interpreted based on codified mean-
ings, but only through mutually shared back-
ground coordinates and an understanding of
others’ communicative intentionality. I have pre-
sented evidence that the underlying immense
psychological complexity is not a developmental
result of, but the starting point for human com-
munication. The findings of an ontogenetic pri-
macy of deictic gestural over symbolic spoken
communication reveal the force of gesture in
the evolution of language. However, the onto-
genetic evidence forces us to consider that it is
not gestures generally that take the lead in the
emergence of language. Instead, the use of rep-
resentational action schemes is a later achieve-
ment, and it is plausible that it is even mediated
by language. Thus, it is deictic gestures specifi-
cally – not gestures generally – that are the step-
ping stone to uniquely human forms of symbol-
ic communication. Deictic gestures, which
emerge already a year after birth and pertain
across life in the single quotidian, uniquely hu-
man and universal form of pointing.
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